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ABSTRACT
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 significantly reduced the taxation
of income—producing properties by accelerating tax depreciation on both new
and, especially, existing properties. A partial reversal of the 1981 legis-
lation appears likely. To provide some insight into the possible effects of a
decrease in tax depreciation of income—producing properties, two potential tax
changes are analyzed: an increase from 15 to 20 years in the tax service lives
of both new and existing properties and an increase for existing properties














The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) significantly reduced the
taxation of income—producing properties by shortening the costrecovery
periods (tax lives) of both new and existing properties. Such an increase in
tax depreciation would, ceteris paribus, raise property values and reduce the
level of real rents. However, we likely will not experience the full increase
in values and decline in rents because a partial reversal of the 1981 Act is
already in process.
In March 1984, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee approved a lengthening
of cost recovery periods for both residential and commercial properties from
15 to 20 years.1 This bill would also recapture, at the time ofsale, all of
the excess depreciation even if an installment sale were utilized. InApril
1984, the full Senate passed a bill increasing the tax service lives to 20
years in 1984, 19 years in 1985 and 18 years thereafter. What form final
legislation will take depends on the outcome of a Senate—House conference and
the concurrence of both full bodies of Congress and the President.
In this paper, we calculate the impact that alternative tax changes
would have on the value of both residential and commercial/industrialproper-
ties. Two separate proposals are considered in detail. The first would
increase tax lives from 15 to 20 years on both new and existing conventional
residential and commercial properties. The second would increase tax livesof
existing properties only. The less—favorable treatment of existing properties
relative to new ones would be consistent with the pre—ERTA tax environment.
1Under the currentproposal, the 15 year recovery period would remain
available to investors in qualified low income housing.—2—
Our model, which extends analyses of earlier tax code changes in two
important respects, is presented in Section 2, and the results for the two tax
changes are reported in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 contains an informal
analysis of the recapture provision and other minor possible variants of the
1984 legislation and provides a general equilibrium prospective. The paper is
summarized in Section 6.
Section 2
THE MODEL AND PARAMETERIZATION
The key element in the computation of investment value responses to tax
code alterations is a simulation model that translates the expected cash flows
associated with a property (net operating income, debt service payments,
depreciation and interest tax savings, and sales proceeds—net of selling costs
and tax liabilities) into a market price (value). The model developed by Ling
and Whinihan (1984) simultaneously determines the optimal expected year of
sale, the sales price in that year (and in all other years because they are
needed to specify the optimal year of sale), and the optimal depreciation
method. Of course, all expected future sales prices (and optimal holding
periods) depend upon all future cash flows, including tax savings and
liabilities
The endogenous determination of future sales prices, rather than the
simplifying assumption that they will be the current price marked up for
general inflation less depreciation, is crucial to analysis of tax changes
should be emphasized that the 'utils' of rental services provided by the
property over time are exogenous. That is, the "want satisfying" ability of
the property is not dependent upon tax law, interest rates, or any other
variables that are subject to change over time. A change in such variables
will affect the equilibrium level of rents, but it will not alter the relative
pattern of these rents over the property's economic life.—3—
that affect new and existing properties differently, such as ERTA and thefive
year stretch out of tax depreciation on existing properties only analyzed in
Section 43 As is shown there, prices of existing propertiesclearly have a
life of their own, a life that affects prices of new properties andlong—run
equilibrium market rents unless trading was suboptimal prior to the taxchange
and is suboptimal after the change.
The second novelty of the model is an explicit consideration ofsupply
factors. This includes both allowing market rents to adjust to theirlong—run
value with a lag and letting reproduction costs or the long—runsupply price
respond to changes in demand.
2.1 The Valuation Equation
The basic valuation equation employed within the dynamicprogramming
algorithm is the traditional discounted cash flow equation that measures and
values cash flows to the equity position after all operating,financial, and
tax expenses have been paid. Assume that
1. the fraction xl of the property's purchase price is financedat the
mortgage or debt rate Pd,
2. the costs associated with refinancing during theholding period are
prohibitive,
3. the property is expected to be sold after hyears at which time a
brokerage commission of 3 percent will be paid, and
4. the cash flows are discounted at the nominal, after—tax,return on
equity, Re.
The value of the property at the beginning ofyear j is:
3For analyses of ERTA that makethe simplifying assumption, see Bruggeman,
Fisher and Stern (1982) and Hendershott and Shilling (1982).• —4—
V(j,h) = (l-To)R(i)+ T0DEPF(i)P(j)
(1)
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where V(j,h) =theinvestment value at the beginning of year jifheld h
years,
R(i) =netoperating income or "rents" in year i of the holding
period,
To =marginalordinary income tax rate,
DEPF(i) =percentageof the initial tax basis that is written off in year
i of the holding period,
P(j) =currentmarket demand price,
P(j+h) =competitivemarket demand price of the property at the end of
the holding period,
Tg =marginalcapital gains tax rate,
ACDP(h) =percentageof the initial tax basis not written off during the
holding period,
PAY(i) =totalmortgage payment, and
L(i) =balanceof the loan at the end of year i of the holding period.
The first two sums are the discounted values, respectively, of the cash flows
from annual operations and the depreciation tax shield. The third and fourth
terms represent the before—tax cash flow from the sale of the property and the
resulting capital gain tax liability.4 The remaining four terms capture the
cash flow effects of debt financing. L(O) represents the initial value of the
4The calculation of the capital gain tax liability in equation (1) assumes
that straight—line depreciation is used. In analyses where accelerated
depreciation is assumed, the equation is adjusted to reflect the appropriate
recapture provisions.mortgage and L(h) the outstanding loan obligation at the end of the holding
period. The two sums are the present values of the mortgage payments and of
the tax savings from interest deductions, respectively.








where m equals the original maturity of the mortgage. Because P(j) is an
endogenous variable equal, for the marginal investor, to V(j,h),thereduced—
form market valuation equation is obtained by substituting V(j,h) forP(j) on
the right hand side of equation (1) and factoring. In reduced form, current
investment value is a function of exogenous parameters and the sellingprice
of the property at the end of the holding period (h years) which is endo-
genously determined in a prior iteration of the algorithm. The competitive
market demand price in year j, P(j), is
P(j) =MAX V(j,h) (4)
hcH
where H equals the number of years of remaining economic life. Theholding
period (h) that maximizes V(j,h) is the optimal holding period for a buyer in
year j. The maximum V(j,h) becomes the market price at the beginning of year
j. It is then used as an input to the investor's optimization problem in
years j—l, j—2, etc.—6—
2.2 Addition of the Supply Side
Equation (1) in conjunction with (4) determines the demand prices for
new and existing properties of every vintage. Full equilibrium requires that,
for new property, P(j) equals the "supply price" or reproduction cost of a new
property, i.e.,
P(j) =P. (5) 5
Theissue here is the specification of reproduction costs or
P5.
The simpliest assumption is that the supply price is independent of
the tax law change and thus that there is no long—run change in the value of
new properties. A richer model is obtained by positing demand and supply
equations for the stock of income—producing properties and solving for the
price that equates them. We assume that supply (Q)iselastic with respect
to price
=
anddemand is b elastic with respect to rents
=aRb,
where>0,b <0.Equating and solving for price
=ZR, (6)—7--
where Z =(a/a)and y =b/s.Simultaneous solution of (1) and (6) ——using
(5) ——thendetermines P and R.
Exhibit 1 illustrates this solution and provides a graphical derivation
of the P(R) relation. The negative Qd(R) relation is illustrated in the
——PUT EXHIBIT 1 NEAR HERE——
lower left panel of the Exhibit, and the positive Q(P) relation is in the
upper right. These quantity relations should be interpreted as relative to
trend; both schedules will shift outward over time. Equation (1), after
substituting P for V(j,h), gives the positively sloped demand schedule in the
upper left panel which is drawn for a specific tax depreciation schedule,
discount rate, etc. The market equilibrium price, rent, and quantity (P°, R°
and Q°) are those consistent with the three schedules. Alternative sets of P
and R that satisfy the and functions are obtained by starting with an R
value on the d schedule in the lower left panel and moving counter—clockwise
through the panels.
An increase in tax service lives (decrease in the depreciation tax
shield) will shift the demand curve to the right, raising rents, lowering
price, and reducing the stock of income—producing properties. Note that if
builders were unresponsive to price ——ifthe Q schedule were vertical (=O)
the supply schedule in the upper left panel would also be vertical andonly
price would change. On the other hand, if builders were totally responsive to
price ——ifthe Q schedule were horizontal thesupply schedule in the
upper left panel would also be horizonal, and only rents and the quantity
would change.—8—







A 70 year economic life is assumed for the improvements based on the
findings of Hulten and Wycoff (1978) .Areverse Sum—of—the—Years—Digit (SYD)
pattern of economic depreciation is assumed over the 70 year life based on
Ling and Whinihan (1984). That is, the utility provided by the improvements
and, therefore, gross rents decline at an increasing rate through time. We
also assume that operating expenses are proportional to gross rents.
It is assumed that land accounts for 20 percent of the property's
initial price and that the value of the land remains constant in real terms.
In some year j, the value of the existing property to a new investor is less
than the market price of the land (residual land value).Thiscondition is
incorporated by modifying the dynamic programming procedure to require that
the market price in year j must equal or exceed the nominal residual land
value.
We assume ERTA tax law in our base—case simulations which offers
identical tax depreciation options to investors in conventional residential
and commercial income properties——l75 percent declining balance or straight—
line with a 15 year cost recovery period. The marginal investor is assumed to
be in a marginal tax bracket (To) on regular income equal to 45 percent and
have a marginal tax rate on capital gain income (Tg) equal to 18 (0.4x45)
percent. We assume that the marginal investor is not affected by minimum tax
complications.
For investors in low to medium tax brackets, a measure of their
opportunity cost of equity capital is the after—tax mortgage interest rate
(plus a risk premium) because fully taxable bonds and mortgages are reasonable
investment alternatives for such investors. For higher tax bracket indivi-
duals, however, tax—exempt securities provide a better after—tax rate of—1 0—
return. Because the long—term municipal bond rate has generally been 70
percent of the fully taxable rate, the after—tax rate of return on equity is
assumed to be equal to 70 percent of the nominal mortgage interest rate
adjusted by a risk premium (PREM)
Re =0.7Rd+PREM. (5)
PREM is set equal to 8 percent.
Two assumptions with respect to the determination of nominal mortgage
interest rates are employed. Case one assumes Fisher interest rates. Rd is
equal to the product of the assumed constant, real, before—tax rate of return
on debt (RRd) and the expected inflation rate ()or
Rd =(l+RRd)(l+ir) —1. (6)
RRd is set equal to 4 percent which implies that d(Rd)/d() =1.04.Because
Re =0.7Rd+pREM,the real after—tax discount rate declines with increases in
anticipated inflation. Consequently, this specification is labeled the low
discount rate case. Case two assumes that nominal mortgage rates respond to
changes in inflation in such a way as to keep the real after—tax mortgage rate
constant for an investor in the 30 percent marginal tax bracket or
Rd =RRd+Tr/0.7, (7)
which implies that d(Rd)/d('ri) =1.43.This specification is labeled the high
discount rate case.—11--
Initial loan—to—value ratios, determined either byoptimizing behavior
(the marginal costs of debt and equity are equal) orleverage constraints
imposed by lenders, are assumed to be 80 percent for residentialproperties
and 75 percent for commercial properties. In bothcases, the loan must be
amortized over 25 years, or by year 70, whichever is less. Nominaloperating
income (rents) and the nominal residual land value for eachyear are computed
by compounding real values at the expected inflation rate.
Studies of residential housing have provided estimates of therelative
price and rent elasticities. There is general agreement that therent
elasticity, b, is about —0.4 [Hanushek and Quigley (1980)].Supply—price
elasticity estimates vary widely. The lowest estimate ofis Poterba's
(1980) 2; Smith (1976) provides an estimate of 9. To obtain thegreatest
plausible slope (in absolute value) for the price—rent relation,we select =
2,in which case y =—0.2.This will provide a high estimate of the decline
in price caused by the tax law change. Thesupply—price elasticities of
commercial and residential properties should be similar. There isless reason
for this to be true of the 'rent" elasticities, but in theabsence of
alternative estimates we take b to be —0.4 for commercialproperties also.
Section 3
INCREASED TAXATION OF BOTH EXISTING AND NEW PROPERTIES
An increase of the tax service life of all properties from 15to 20
years will lower property values and raise real rents. Estimates of these
impacts for new and existing residential and commercialproperties are
reported below.—12—
New Residential Properties
Exhibit 2 contains estimates of the impact of the tax law change on new
residential properties under two expected inflation senarios (4 and 8
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percent), two different discount rates (low and high), and three supply
elasticities (zero, infinity, and 2) .Theexhibit reports the immediate
percentage change in real price or value, the long—run (beyond four years)
percentage change in real price, and the long—run percentage change in real
rents. The specific method of calculating price and rent changes for
different supply—price elasticities and a general interpretation of the
changes are as follows. For a zero supply elasticity, equation (1) is solved
for value assuming constant real rents (R) .Thusthe percentage change in
rents is zero and the immediate and long—run changes in price are equal. For
the infinite—elasticity results, real rents are assumed to be constant for
four years and then jump to a level consistent with an unchanged real value of
new properties at that time. Thus the long—run change in real price is zero;
the immediate decline in price reflects the failure of real rents to jump
immediately to their new equilibrium level and the constraint that the
property earns the market rate of return. In the case of a finite elasticity
(2 in our calculations) ,realrents are constant for four years and then jump
to a level consistent with the simultaneous solution of equations (1) and
(6). The four—year real rent adjustment is, in our view, conservative in that
the resultant decline in value is likely to be on the high side. In fact,
real rents will begin to rise shortly after the tax change (or even prior to
the actual change if the change is effective retroactively)—13—
EXHIBIT 2
INCREASE IN TAX LIFE OF EXISTING AND NEW PROPERTIES: NEW RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
Supply Immediate %L\ Long-Run%A Long—Run %A
Elasticity(s) in Price in Real Price in Real Rents
Inflation Rate of 4%
Low 0 —12.3 —12.3 ——
Discount —2.5 —— 14.0
Rate 2 —4.2 —2.2 12.2
High 0 —10.7 —10.7 ——
Discount —2.5 —— 12.0
Rate 2 —4.0 —1.8 9.8
Inflation Rate of 8%
Low 0 —12.5 —12.5 ——
Discount —2.1 —— 14.4
Rate 2 —4.2 —2.5 11.5
High 0 —9.4 —9.4
Discount —2.1 —— 10.3
Rate 2 —3.1 —1.2 9.0—14—
Exhibit 3 illustrates the alternative assumptions and responses. As
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notedin the discussion of Exhibit 1, the lengthening of tax life from 15 to
20 years shifts the demand schedule out to the right. Assuming low inflation
and discount rates (see the top panel of Exhibit 2) and a zero supply—price
elasticity (constant real rents) ,price(value) would decline by 12.3 percent
from point A to B. Because the zero—response case implies that builders would
continue to supply new structures at the same rate as prior to the tax law
change even though the price at which the structures can be sold to investors
has declined by 12.3 percent, this result is totally unrealistic. In
contrast, with an infinite supply elasticity, the price of new structures
declines by only 2.5 percent from point A to point C. As time passes ——as
the years in which new properties will earn below long—run equilibrium rents
declines and the demand for the services from income—producing properties
grows, real rents and value rise together along the vector CD. Under our
assumptions, point D is reached after 4 years. New properties will then
command the same real price as they did before the tax law change, and real
rents are 14 percent higher. With a finite—supply elasticity, the long—run
real price declines by 2.2 percent (point F), and the initial decline in
price, reflecting both four years of below long—run real rents and the lower
long—run real price, is 4.2 percent (point E). Real rents rise by 12.2
percent in the long run. A "realistic estimate" of the immediate decline in
value is 2.5 to 4.2 percent.
Inspection of the remainder of Exhibit 2 reveals little sensitivity of
the realistic estimate to alternative assumptions regarding the inflation and
discount rates. Increases in these rates do lower the estimated price
decline, but only to the 2.1 to 3.1 percent range.Exhibit 3: An Illustration of Real Price and Rent Responses















Exhibit 4 contains the price changes for existing residential proper-
ties. The calculations presume that prior to the tax change the marginal
——PLACE EXHIBIT 4 NEAR HERE—-
investor assumed that the real estate provisions of ERTA would be in effect
for the remaining life of the property and after the change that the new law
will be in effect for the remaining life. The first column lists the
remaining years of economic life (70 years is a new property) ,thesecond the
supply—price elasticity, and the third the percentage change in price. The
calculations are performed for the low and high inflation rate and high—
discount rate cases. The percentage changes in rents are not reported because
they are determined by (and are equal to) those for new properties. The
realistic ranges of percentage declines in price are contrasted with that for
new properties, 2½ to 4 percent.
Two offsetting factors are at work in these calculations. On the one
hand, the four years of below long—run level market rents increases in
relative importance as the total number of years that long—run market rents
would be earned declines. Thus, the decline in value would be expected to be
greater the shorter the remaining life of the property. On the other hand,
the ratio of the value of the structure to the total value of the property
declines as the property ages. Thus the negative impact of the reduced tax
depreciation on the price, ignoring rent changes, is less the shorter is the
remaining life of the property. (This is indicated by declining price impacts
in the zero elasticity case.) From Exhibit 4, we see that the structure/value
effect outweighs the rent effect throughout the first 30 years of life and
then again in the last 20 years, but the rent effect dominates in the middle
years. In the low inflation rate case, the realistic range of price decline—17--
EXHIBIT 4
INCREASE IN TAX LIFE OF EXISTING AND NEW PROPERTIES: USED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
Remaining Yrs. Long—Run Supply % Change in Price % Change in Price
of Econ. Life Elasticity () (lowinflation) (high inflation)
70 0 —10.7 —9.4
70 —2.5 —2.1







40 0 —9.1 —7.5
40 —1.8 —1.0




20 0 —7.0 —6.0
20 —1.6 —1.0
20 2 —2.6 —1.6—18—
falls from 2.5 to 4.0 percent on new properties to 1.8 to 3.1 percent for 30
year old properties (40 years remaining life) ,isroughly constant for a
decade, and then declines further after 40 years. With an 8 percent expected
inflation rate, the range declines from 2.1 to 3.1 percent on new properties
to 1.0 to 1.8 percent for 30 year properties and is then roughly constant for
the next two decades.
Commercial Properties
Exhibit 5 reports the same estimates as Exhibit 2, except for new
commercial properties rather than residential properties. Assuming low
inflation and discount rates (top panel of Exhibit 5) and a zero supply—price
——PLACE EXHIBIT 5 NEAR HERE——
elasticity, price would decline by 24.6 percent. With an infinite supply
elasticity, the immediate percentage price decrease would be 5.3 percent. The
corresponding long—run increase in real rents is 32.6 percent. With a
finite—supply elasticity of 2, the immediate price decline is 8.9 percent, and
the long—run increase in real rents is 26.5 percent.
These commercial price responses are roughly twice as large as the
corresponding residential results. This is because straight—line, rather than
accelerated, depreciation is optimal for commercial property and the time
profile of straight—line deductions is more adversely affected than that of
accelerated depreciation, by the five—year lengthening of cost recovery—19—
EXHIBIT 5
INCREASE IN TAX LIFE OF EXISTING AND NEW PROPERTIES: NEW COMMERCIAL PROPERTY
Supply Immediate %L Long—Run%t Long-Run %1\
Elast±city()in Price in Real Price in Real Rents
Inflation Rate of 4%
Low 0 —24.6 —24.6 ——
Discount —5.3 —— 32.6
Rate 2 —8.9 —4.6 26.5
High 0 —19.7 —19.7 ——
Discount —5.0 —— 24.6
Rate 2 —7.7 —3.7 20.0
Inflation Rate of 8%
Low 0 —16.4 —16.4 ——
Discount —3.1 —— 19.6
Rate 2 —5.7 —3.0 16.0
High 0 —11.0 —11.0 ——
Discount —2.7 —— 12.4
Rate 2 —4.3 —2.1 10.0—20—
periods .
Percentagedecreases for commercial property are more sensitive to
alternative assumptions regarding inflation and discount rates than were those
for residential properties. With 8 percent inflation, a relatively low
discount rate, and zero supply—price elasticity, price will decline by only
16.4 percent (versus 24.6% at 4% inflation) .Arealistic estimate of the
immediate price decline would decrease to the 3.1 to 5.7 range (from the 5.3
to 8.9 range at 4 percent inflation) .Thereduced commercial price declines
at higher levels of inflation reflect the use of historical cost accounting.
Taking away a fixed percentage of tax depreciation will have less of an impact
on price because all depreciation is relatively less valuable at higher levels
of inflation.
Section 4
INCREASED TAXATION OF EXISTING PROPERTIES ONLY
Prior to ERTA, existing properties were treated less favorably than new
properties. Analysis of an increase from 15 to 20 years in the tax service
life of existing properties only should provide an understanding of the
significance of this differential treatment.
5For example, with accelerateddepreciation the five year stretchout reduces
the present value of the first 8 years of depreciation deductions by 20%
(assuming 71= 4%and a relatively high discount rate) .Thecorresponding
straight—line reduction is 37%. The impact on market prices of this
relatively larger decrease in the value of the depreciation tax shield is then
amplified by the resultant decline in the value of the interest tax shield.
To demonstrate the interaction of tax depreciation and debt financing on
market prices, we ran select simulations assuming pure equity fianancing.
With 4% inflation, relatively high discount rate, zero supply price
elasticity, and an equity risk premium of 4%, the 5 year stretchout reduces
residential prices by 4.6% (versus 10.7% with debt financing) .The
corresponding price decrease for commercial property is a slightly larger 5.5%
(versus 19.7% with debt financing) .Theseresults suggest that greater use of
equity financing reduces the magnitude of price responses and decreases the
disparity between commercial and residential price declines.—21—
At first glance one might suppose that the increase in tax service life
for existing property only would lower the value of existing properties by the
amount deduced in our earlier experiment and leave the value of new properties
unchanged. Neither of these suppositions is generally correct. The value of
new properties would be unchanged only if any trade of the property were
suboptimal before the tax change. Only in this event is the value of new
properties independent of the tax treatment of existing properties. If some
trading were optimal, then new properties will decline in value in response to
the less favorable treatment of existing properties. Obviously the decline
will be less than if new properties, too, were taxed less favorably.(In
terms of Exhibit 3, the rightward shift in the demand schedule is less.)
Thus, a smaller increase in real rents is needed for new properties to
continue earning the market rate of return. Given the smaller rent increase,
the decline in the value of existing properties will be greater than if both
new and existing properties were taxed less favorably.
Results for residential property are reported in Exhibit 7 for both the
low (4 percent) and high (8 percent) expected inflation and discount rate
——PLACE EXHIBIT 7 NEAR HERE-—
senarios (the third set of results is described below).Thecalculations
confirm the above analysis. The long—run percentage increase in real rents is
less than half that computed when both new and existing propertieswere taxed
less favorably, and the reasonable range of estimated price decline innew
properties is 40 percent less, 1.5 to 2.2 percent versus the earlier 2.5 to
4.0 percent. In contrast, the decline in the value of existing(one—year old)
properties is a far sharper 6.6 to 7.4 percent. With higher expected
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































relationship between inflation and the value of depreciation deductions based
on historical costs.
As noted, the impact of the increased taxation of existingproperties on
the value of new properties and thus the equilibrium level ofrents depends on
how soon new properties are likely to be traded and becomeexisting properties
under the tax code. For example, if refinancing were costless and the
expected inflation rate exceeded 6 percent, then new properties arenever
expected to be traded under ERTA provisions (Hendershott and Ling, 1984) and
taxing existing properties less favorably would have no impact on either the
value of new properties or the level of rents.
It is noteworthy that the same, sharp decline in the value ofexisting
properties can occur in response to a tax change even if the taxation of
existing properties is not altered. More specifically, more favorable
taxation of new properties has the same impact as does less favorabletaxation
of existing properties. In the former case, a decline in thelevel of future
rents, which are determined from the conditions that investors innew
properties will earn the market rate of return and the value of newproperties
is ultimately determined by the supply price, is thesource of the decline in
6
value.
Exhibit 8 contains the same estimates as Exhibit 7,except for new and
existing commercial properties rather than residential properties. Thelong—
run increase in real rents, assuming 4 percent inflation and infinitesupply—
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6Auerbach (1983,pp. 491—96) estimated that the more favorable treatment of
new business investment in 1981 reduced the value of theexisting capital
stock by $131 billion, and Hendershott (1982,pp. 71—72) contended that
providing subsidies for new housing units (as in the 'Lugar bill'passed by












































































































































































































































































































































































































elasticity, is 18.5 percent (versus 24.6 percent when the tax lives of both
new and used properties are increased to 20 years).Estimatesof immediate
price declines for new properties decrease to the 4.4 to 6.4range from the
5.0 to 7.7 range. The decline in the price of existingproperty is increased
to the 8.6 to 10.6 range.
With 8 percent inflation, responses are againdampened by historical
cost accounting. With an infinite supply elasticity, thelong—run increase in
real rents is reduced to 8.8 percent and the estimatedrange of immediate
price declines for new properties falls to 2.1 to 3.2percent from the 2.7 to
4.3 range. Immediate price declines for existingproperties increase to the
5.1 to 6.2 range.
Section 5
OTHER TAX LAW CHANGES
The U.S. Senate Finance Committee consideredrecapturing at the point of
sale all or some of the straight—line depreciation takenon a property if it
sold in less than 10 years and approved legislation that wouldrecapture all
of the excess depreciation even if an installment salewere utilized. The
bill passed by the full U.S. Senate would increase tax servicelives to 20
years in 1985, but shift back to 19 years in 1986 and 18years in 1987 and
thereafter. The motivations for and possible impacts of theseprovisions are
discussed in turn.
The increased taxation of properties traded in less than 10years is
obviously aimed at reducing the uchurninglt of properties or at leastletting
the Treasury (taxpayers generally) benefit from thechurning (or suffer
smaller loses if the churning is motivated by taxconsiderations). Churning
of income—properties has undoubtedly been substantial inrecent years in
response to the passage of ERTA which has allowed investors tosubstantially—26—
accelerate their tax depreciation schedules (move to a 15 year life) simply by
engaging in outright sales and repurchases. However, the concern with
churning at this point seems misplaced. For one thing, investors desiring to
get onto ERTA's more favorable depreciation schedule are probably already
there. The horse is out; it's too late to close the barn door. For another,
the current lengthening of tax lives will itself strongly discourage churning.
In our estimation, this particular provision is unlikely to have a significant
impact on real estate values or rents.7
The recapture of excess depreciation even in the presence of an
installment sale, too, is unlikely to have a significant impact on real rents
and prices. The Treasury acknowledges that installment sales are not widely
used and thus that a stricter taxation of them will not have a major impact.
The Treasury apparently fears a rapid expansion of installment sales and
wishes to nip the growth in the bud.8
The rationale for the temporary increase in tax service lives to 20
years in 1984 and then reversal to 18 years by 1986 is unclear. The tem-
porally severe tax treatment should substantially reduce building and develop-
ment, as well as trading, in 1984 and 1985. Possibly Congress wishes to
reduce inflationary pressures near term (1984 and 1985) and to raise tax
revenues longer term (1986 when the trades postponed from 1984 and 1985
occur). And then, maybe there really is a tooth fairy.
7Users of properties who think there isa significant probability of their
needing the property for less than 10 years and thus being taxed especially
heavily upon sale would have an incentive to lease properties.
8The use of installment sales isanalogous to the use of builder bonds in that
both can substantially defer tax payments. Builder bonds have been widely
used, much to the Treasury's dismay.—27—
The partial equilibrium nature of our results needsto be emphasized
before we conclude the analysis. If thechanged tax law generates additional
Treasury revenue and discourages development of newproperties, interest rates
are likely to be lower.9 This would, ofcourse, act to dampen the decline in
values and the increase in long—run rents. Thatis, a decline in interest
rate would shift the demand curve in Exhibit 3 tothe left, tending to offset
the tax—depreciation shift to the right. Thus farwe have made the plausible
assumption that the decline in interest rates would benegligible. However,
if the increased taxation of real estate isjust a small part of a broad
deficit reduction package, then a significantreduction in interest rates
could occur. Such a reduction is, in fact, theprofessed intent of the
legislation.
To illustrate the potential positive value ofa deficit reduction
package, even one including more severe taxation of realestate, on property
values, we have run simulations in which the tax lifeon new and existing
properties is increased from 15 to 20 years and the basic debtrate is lowered
by one or two percentage points. The resultssuggest that about a one and a
quarter percentage point decline in the debt rate wouldapproximately offset
the impact of the increase in tax service lifeon residential properties.
Larger declines are necessary to offset the impacton commercial properties.
9For a generalequilibrium analysis of the passage of ERTA, whichconcluded
that real interest rates could rise byas much as two percentage points and
fully offset the more favorable tax treatment of rentalhousing, see
Hendershott and Shilling (1982).—28—
Section 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we calculate the impact that alternative tax code changes
would have on the value of both residential and commercial properties. This
research was stimulated by the lengthy deliberations of the Finance Committee
of the U.S. Senate in the Winter of 1984, deliberations that resulted in
passage by the full Senate in April 1984 of legislation partially reversing
the substantial benefits conferred upon real property by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981.(What form final legislation will take depends on the
outcome of a Senate—House Conference and future concurrence by the full
Congress and the President.) Two separate proposals are considered in detail
in this paper. The first would increase cost recovery periods (tax lives)
from 15 to 20 years on both new and existing conventional residential and
commercial properties. The second would increase to 20 years the recovery
periods of existing properties only.
An increase in cost recovery periods will, ceteris paribus, lower
property values and raise real rents. Full equilibrium requires that
investment value of new properties to the marginal investor equals the
reproduction costs (supply price) of new properties. With an infinite supply
elasticity, the long—run change in real price and value is zero; the immediate
decline in price reflects the failure of real rents instantaneously to attain
their new long—run equilibrium. With a finite supply elasticity, the
immediate decline in price reflects both rent adjustment lags and decreased
production costs in response to a lowered demand. We assume a four year real
rent adjustment lag which is, in our opinion, conservatLve in that estimated—29—
price declines are likely to be on the high side. In keeping with this
conservative posture, we assume an elasticity of 2 in our finite supply
elasticity simulations, the lowest figure with any empirical support.
With low (4 percent) inflation, a five year stretchout in tax lives will
cause an immediate decline in the price of new residential properties of up to
4 percent. The long—run increase in real rents associated with this price
decline is 10 to 12 percent, and the long—run price and quantity declines are
2 and 4 percent, respectively. Assuming that the four percent quantity
decline occurs over a four—year period, and that normal real gross investment
is 5 percent of the stock, investment in rental properties would be cut by 20
percent during this span. With high (8 percent) inflation and a relatively
high discount rate, all the estimated changes are about a percentage point
less.
Estimated price declines for new commercial properties are significantly
greater than those for residential properties. With low inflation, price
could decline 9 percent and rents rise by 25 percent. These larger commercial
price and rent responses reflect the optimal use of straight—line
depreciation, the time profile of which is more adversely affected by the
five—year stretchout of the cost recovery period. With high inflation the
commercial price declines fall to the 4 to 6 percent range and rent increases
to the 10 to 15 percent range. This decrease reflects the use of historical
cost accounting.
Similar analysis was performed on existing (up to 50 year old)
properties. In general, the range of price reductions decreases ever so
slightly with the age of the property. While the impact of four years of
below long—run market rents looms larger as the number ofyears in which rent
will be earned decreases and thus tends to exaggerate the price declines—30—
relative to new properties, the ratio of depreciable structure to the total
value of the property declines as the property ages, mitigating the price
decline.
A five year increase in the tax lives of existing properties only would
reduce the range of price declines for new residential properties by roughly
40 percent relative to what would occur if both new and existing properties
were taxed less favorably. The decline in the value of existing (one—year
old) properties, however, increases to the 6½ to 7½ percent range. The price
declines on new properties reflect the increased taxation, and the resultant
decline in value, of existing properties. Because new properties would fall
less in value if the five year stretchout only applied to existing properties,
a smaller long—run increase in real rents is required to enable new property
investors to earn the market rate of return. This would amplify the impact on
existing properties because market rents would be determined by the impact of
the legislation on new properties.
The partial equilibrium nature of our results needs to be emphasized.
If the increased taxation of depreciable real estate is just a small part of a
broad deficit reduction package, then a significant reduction in real interest
rates would likely occur. We estimate that, for residential property, a one
and a quarter percentage point decline in nominal debt rates would approxi-
mately offset the negative impact of the five year stretchout in tax lives on
new and existing properties.(In the absence of such a decline, both rents
and the homeownership rate will tend to rise, the opposite of the response to
ERTA.) For commercial properties, possibly twice as large a decline in
interest rates would be necessary to offset the more adverse depreciation.—31—
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